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While the workow paradigm, emerged from the eld of business processes, has been proven to be the most
successful paradigm for creating scientic applications for execution also on Grid infrastructures, most of the current
Grid workow management systems still cannot deliver the quality, robustness and reliability that are needed for
widespread acceptance as tools used on a day-to-day basis for scientists from a multitude of scientic elds. This
paper introduces the current state of the art in fault tolerance techniques for Grid workow systems. The examined
categories and the summary of current solutions reveal future directions in this area and help to guide research towards
open issues.
1 Introduction
In the past years, the workow paradigm has emerged as the most successful paradigm for creating scientic applica-
tions for execution on Grid infrastructures. Numerous groups from all over the world have created a plethora of Grid
workow description languages and Grid workow management systems, all of them sharing the same basic goals:
to create a system that can be used to easily and reliably execute workow applications on huge heterogeneous Grid
systems.
Up to now, most of the existing Grid workow systems still cannot deliver the quality, robustness and reliability
that is needed for widespread acceptance as tools used on a day-to-day basis for scientists from a multitude of scientic
elds. The scientists typically want to use the grid to compute solutions for complex problems, potentially utilizing
thousands of resources for workows that can run for several hours, days or even weeks. With a system that has a low
tolerance for faults, the users will regularly be confronted with a situation that makes them lose days or even weeks
of valuable computation time because the system could not recover from a fault that happened before the successful
completion of their workow applications. This is, of course, intolerable for anyone trying to effectively use the
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Grid, and makes scientists accept a slower solution that only uses their own computing resources because of a higher
reliability and controllability of these systems.
Due to the heterogeneous and distributed nature of Grid systems, faults inevitably happen. This problem can
only be overcome by highly fault-tolerant systems. The reasons for faults in a Grid environment are manifold: the
geographically widespread nature encompassing multiple autonomous administrative domains, variations in the con-
guration of the different systems, overstrained resources that may stop responding or show unpredictable behavior,
faults in the network infrastructure that connects the systems, hardware failures and systems running out of memory
or disk space are just some of the possible sources of faults.
This report shows the current state of the art in fault tolerance techniques for Grid workow systems. We will
show which faults can be detected, prevented and recovered by which current Grid workow system, the areas where
the current systems are planned to improve and which areas are still in need of more research effort.
2 Questionnaires for surveying
2.1 Related work
The taxonomy by Buyya et al. in [3] introduces a general view of existing workow managing solutions. A part of
it focuses on fault tolerance, where they use a task- and workow-level division. We used and further extended these
categories, keeping the scope on fault tolerance. While the presented taxonomy reveals a glimpse of the overviewed
systems, in this paper we give a detailed description and comparison of their properties.
In [1], Hwang et al. propose a multi-layered approach for fault tolerance in workows. They segment the tech-
niques into task-level and workow-level techniques. The former tries to hide faults that happen during the execution
of single tasks at the workow-level, while the latter manipulates the structure of the workow to deal with faults
dynamically.
2.2 Questionnaire conformation and description
To build a general and objective vision of state-of-the-art fault tolerance support in grid workow management sys-
tems, we not only have made an extensive literature review, but also have sent out a detailed questionnaire (see
Appendix).
On the rst page we asked for general information: contact data and history on fault tolerance. We divided the
target questions into two main categories: fault detection on one hand and fault recovery and prevention on the other.
In both categories we identied several layers where detection as well as recovery and prevention can exist. Faults
can be detected at Hardware, Operating System, Middleware, Task, Workow or User level. At the lowest level, the
Hardware level, machine crashes and network connectivity errors can happen. At the level of Operating Systems, tasks
may run out of memory or disk space, or exceed CPU time limits or disk quota. Other faults like network congestion
or le non-existence can also happen. One level higher at the Middleware, we could nd non-responding services,
probably caused by too many concurrent requests. Authentication, le staging or job submission failures can happen,
and submitted jobs could hang in local queues, or even be lost before reaching the local resource manager. At the level
of Tasks, job-related faults can happen, like deadlock, livelock, memory leak, uncaught exceptions, missing shared
libraries or job crashes, even incorrect output results could be produced. At Workow level, failures can occur in data
movement or innite loops in dynamic workows. Incorrect or not available input data could also produce faults.
Finally, at the highest level, the User level, user-denable exceptions and assertions can cause errors (for example the
users can dene conditions, such as the output le size should not be bigger than 5 MB). Beside all these attributes,
the developers had the opportunity to add new ones, like incorrect job description format at the Middleware level. We
created two tables questioning the above mentioned attributes. The rst one answers whether the system can detect
and cope with these faults (prevent or recover). The second one is used to name the service or component the system
uses to detect the listed faults.
In the fault prevention and recovery tables, we distinguished among three abstraction levels. The treatment mech-
anisms can act at Task-, Workow- or User-level. At the Task level, recovery is used when a failed job is restarted
on the same remote resource or resubmitted to another one. Generally it is simple to implement this technique; upon
detecting a failure, the task is rescheduled to either the same or to another resource for another try. Resubmission can
cause signicant overheads if the following tasks have to wait for the completion of the failed task. Saving checkpoints
and restarting later or even migrating jobs can be a good prevention and recovery mechanism. This technique stores all
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the intermediate data of a task that is needed to restore the task to the current state. This allows for migration of a task
to another system in case of failure: it can resume execution from the last checkpoint, unlike simple resubmissions,
where jobs should be started over from the beginning.
Task replication can prevent resource failures, while alternate task creation can recover from internal task failures
(in this case another task implementation is executed). On failures of the task manager itself, recovery means restarting
the service or choosing another one. Finally resource reliability measurements can also prevent job execution faults.
At Workow level, redundancy, data and workow replication can prevent faults. Redundancy, sometimes called
replication in related work, executes one task concurrently on several resources, assuming that one of the tasks will
nish without a failure. It can cause overhead by occupying more resources than necessary, but guarantees failure-free
execution as long as at least one task does not fail. Light- and Heavy-weight checkpointing can also be used for both
prevention and recovery. Generally this technique can be used to save an intermediate state of a whole workow for
a restart at a later point in time. Light-weight checkpointing saves only the current location of the intermediate data,
not the data itself. It is fast, but restarting can only work as long as the intermediate data is available at its original
location. Heavy-weight checkpointing saves all the intermediate data to a place, where it can be kept as long as it
is needed. In case of a failure of a service that is needed to manage the workow execution, a system can use the
Management Service Redundancy technique that chooses another equivalent service or restart the faulty service to
resume operation. The transaction and rollback mechanisms can be used for the same reason. Should the workow
manager itself crash, restarting the service or choosing another manager means a high-level recovery option. Finally
the task manager reliability measurements can prevent choosing managers that are known to be unreliable.
At the highest level, the User level, user-dened exceptions can be taken into account to validate proper execution.
The questionnaire also contained two tables for this section: the rst is used to tell whether the listed mechanism is
supported or not, the second is for naming the service that handles the faults.
3 Evaluation
3.1 ASKALON
The goal of ASKALON [2] is to simplify the development and optimization of applications that can harness the
power of Grid computing. This project crafts a novel environment based on new innovative tools, services, and
methodologies to make Grid application development and optimization for real applications an everyday practice.
The system is centered around a set of high-level services for transparent and effective Grid access, including a
Scheduler for optimized mapping of workows onto the Grid, an Enactment Engine for application execution, a
Resource Manager covering both computers and application components, and a Performance Prediction service based
on training phase and statistical methods. ASKALON builds upon its own XML-based workow language called
AGWL that not only covers the usual DAG-based workow approach, but adds complex constructs such as parallel
loops and conditional statements such as switch and if/then/else. At the hardware level, the system detects and recovers
from machine crashes and network failures. Askalon detects faults like exceeded disk quota, out of disk space and le
not found faults at the OS level and can recover from the rst two of them. On the middleware-level, the system is
able to detect failed authentication, failed job submissions, unreachable services and le staging failures, and is able
to recover from a failed job submission. The Task level faults are not detected by the system, and therefore it cannot
recover from them either. On the workow-level, unavailable input data and data movement faults can be detected,
and the system can also recover from data movement faults. Askalon does not support user-denable exceptions or
assertions in its current version, but this is planned for a future release.
3.2 Chemomentum
The Chemomentum project [8] takes up and enhances state-of-the-art Grid technologies and applies them to real-
world challenges in computational chemistry and related application areas. It helps the transformation of computing
paradigms in these areas towards collaborative research and Grid computing. The Chemomentum system is currently
under development and will build upon UNICORE 6 [9], the web-services version of UNICORE released in 2007,
adding a two-layer workow engine on top of the UNICORE 6 middleware. The top layer, called process engine,
deals with the high-level workow concepts, while the lower layer, called service orchestrator, deals directly with
lower-level concepts such as running jobs and moving les. The actual act of processing of the tasks themselves is
given to the underlying UNICORE 6 system, using XNJS as the entity that accesses the different Grid sites batch-
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and le-systems. Fault tolerance is a very important topic for Chemomentum. At the low level, machine and network
failures can be detected by the UNICORE 6 infrastructure; recovery from these faults is planned for a future version
of Chemomentum. Chemomentum cannot detect faults at the OS level, but the system is able to detect authentication
failures, failed job submissions, non-responding or non-reachable services and le-staging failures at the middleware
level. It can recover from failed job submissions (handled by the service orchestrator) and in case a service is un-
reachable. Taking a look at the task level, the system is able to detect crashed jobs, but cannot recover from this
fault. At Workow level, the system can detect unavailable input data and data movement failures (handled by the
service orchestrator), but cannot prevent them or recover from such a fault. User denable exceptions or assertions are
not supported in Chemomentum. It relies heavily on the underlying UNICORE 6 middleware for fault detection and
recovery; the Chemomentum system itself mainly adds higher-level fault detection and recovery features on top.
3.3 Escogitare WFMS
One of the main targets of the Escogitare project [10] is to enable agriculture scientists, located in several CRA insti-
tutes spread all over Italy, to conduct bioinformatics and geoinformatics experiments using a workow management
system that is able to select data and instruments installed in several laboratories in a transparent and secure way. The
project has been started 2 years ago. The enactor uses the BPEL language [11] for describing workows. The system
mainly relies on the catch operation of BPEL, and fault tolerance is not the most important feature. At the lowest,
Hardware level, machine and network failures can be detected and prevented by MDS4 [6], and they are planning to
support recovery of these faults in the future version of the enactor. Operating system faults can be detected by reports
of the invoked Web Service; they also work on recovery for future releases. At Middleware level, non-responding
or non-reachable services are detected, the recovery is being investigated for future version, as well as authentication
failure detection. Task execution faults are recognized by the responsible Web Service reports, but recovery is still
under development. At Workow level, loops, input errors and non-availability are detected. At the highest level
user denable exceptions are handled by the BPEL catch and catchAll construct, therefore they are detected, and
recovery is planned to be supported in a future version of the system. All the BPEL language related faults are handled
by the ActiveBPEL 2.0 Engine [11] used by Escogitare. Though they rely on the detection and prevention support of
their utilized components in the current version of the system, recovery is not available. Since the ActiveBPEL Engine
gives the framework for recovery features, for the future version a higher level fault tolerance is under development. At
the Workow level redundancy, data replication and the transaction/rollback mechanisms are planned to be supported,
while at the Task level resubmissions are investigated.
3.4 GWEE
The Grid Workow Execution Engine (GWEE) [12] is developed at Umea University in Sweden. The workow engine
is implemented as a WSRF service and its fault detection and recovery is dependent on the grid service container
provided by Globus Toolkit version 4. The workow engine itself is independent of client applications as well as
middleware. The developers believe that this kind of support must be provided by the client application or portal
that is using the GWEE for state management and dependency control. When a fault occurs, the workow engine
receives the signal and propagates the fault to the client application. The client application is responsible for taking
an appropriate action in GWEE. That is also the reason why the engine itself is not able to detect, prevent or recover
from faults at the Hardware- or Operating System-level. At the middleware-level, the GWEE can detect and recover
from failed authentications, failed job submissions and le staging failures using the Enactor/Executor plugin and the
Workow service. At Task level, the system can detect and recover from a crashed job, but not from other faults
like memory leaks, uncaught exceptions, deadlocks or missing shared libraries. On the workow level, failed data
movement can be detected and recovered from, but innite loops, unavailable input data and input errors remain
undetected. User-denable exceptions and assertions are not supported directly by GWEE; the system leaves that
to the client applications. At the workow-level, GWEE implements fault recovery techniques like workow level
checkpointing (light- and heavy-weight) as well as transaction/rollback mechanisms, it can pause and resume the
workow using GT4-provided functionality. Data and workow replication is not handled by the engine itself, but has
to be provided by high-level services or client applications on top of GWEE. At Task and User-level, GWEE does not
employ fault recovery or prevention techniques.
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3.5 GWES
The Grid Workow Execution Service [13] is the workow enactment engine of the K-Wf Grid [14], which coordinates
the creation and execution process of Grid workows. It was rst announced in 2003. The new version that supports
high-level fault tolerance was released this year, therefore fault tolerance is an important feature of the system. The
GWES uses High Level Petri Nets for modeling workows, which are very suitable regarding fault management issues,
as they contain the whole workow state. At the lowest level, machine crashes and network failures can be detected
and the system is able to recover with the help of the ResourceUpdater component of GWES. At the Operating system
level, if a le is not found, it can be detected by RFT [5], and the system can recover using its activity-handling
component. At Middleware level, authentication, le staging and job submission failures can be detected through WS-
GRAM [6], and the system is able to recover from these failures. When a service is not reachable or not available, it
is detected, and the recovery is done by the ResourceUpdater. At Task level the correctness of output data is validated,
job crashes can be detected by WS-GRAM or through Web Service responses, and the system is able to recover. At
the top Workow and User levels all the listed faults can be detected and handled with recovery. In general, the GWES
handles faults mainly at the Workow and Task level. This means, if an activity fails on one host, then it is repeated on
another host, depending on the fault type. If no host is left as candidate, then a new resource matching is done to nd
new resources. In addition, GWES features some basic monitoring of hardware, software and services. The results of
this monitoring are stored in a XML database which is used as basis for the resource matching. Due to this technique,
the system can recover from many fault types, even without knowing the specic reason of the fault. In addition to the
traditional batch Grid fault types, the GWES takes care about the fault tolerance in a pure Web Service environment,
evaluating and responding to SOAP [15] faults returned by a remote Web Service method call. Focusing on recovery
and prevention, at Workow level, redundancy, workow replication and checkpointing are handled by the system
itself. Heavy-weight workow checkpointing is only supported for workows enacting pure Web Services (SOAP).
Data replication mostly depends on the underlying data layer or le system, and is not handled by GWES itself (SRB,
gpfs or user-dened). At Task level, job retry and resubmission is supported by the system, and resource reliability
measurement is done utilizing a simple score mechanism (ala eBay [16]). Finally, user dened exception handling
is also supported. The system supports user-dened fault management in a way that the user can insert additional
sub-workows in order to evaluate and react on specic workow activity results (exit status, data, side effects, ...).
This makes it possible to react on application specic faults (e.g. restart licence server if application returns some exit
code).
3.6 Pegasus
Pegasus [17] (Planning for Execution in Grids) is a workow mapping engine rst released in 2001. It bridges the
scientic domain and the execution environment by automatically mapping the high-level workow descriptions onto
distributed infrastructures. At the lowest, Hardware and Operating System levels, it can detect exceeding CPU time
limit and le non-existence, and by the help of DAGMan [18] it can recover from machine crashes and network
failures. They nd fault tolerance important, and as a future step they plan to support recovery from running out
of disk space or exceeding disk quota. At the level of Middleware, it detects authentication, le staging and job
submission faults, and the system is able to recover with DAGMan. At Task and Workow levels job crashes and input
unavailability are detected, data movement faults can also be treated with recovery, again with DAGMan. Regarding
recovery and prevention, at Workow level redundancy is used and light-weight checkpoints are supported by Pegasus
itself. At Task level retries, resubmissions and checkpointing are supported, task migration, replication and alternate
task creation are planned for future version.
3.7 P-GRADE WFMS
The P-GRADE Grid Portal [4] is a web based, service rich environment for the development, execution and monitoring
of workows and workow based parameter studies on various grid platforms, which is available since 4 years. Its
Workow Manager is based on DAGMan, and during the development of the new version they take into account
advanced fault-tolerant features. At the lowest level, the Hardware level, machine crashes and network failures are
detected, and the system is able to recover from these faults. At the Operating System and Middleware levels, running
out of memory, disk space or exceeding disk quota can be recognized by the manager, and it is also able to recover.
Missing les can be prevented, detected and also treated with recovery. Service unavailability, authentication, le
staging, job submission, job hanging in the queue of a job manager or being lost before reaching it can be detected
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by the enactor with the help of Resource Managers (GRAM [5], EGEE WMS [7]), and recovery from these faults are
also supported. Incorrect job descriptions can also be prevented by the Workow Manager. At Task level, job crashes
are detected, and recovery is also supported for faults caused by missing shared libraries. At Workow level, input
unavailability can be prevented, in case of input loss it can be detected and treated with recovery, which is also the case
for other data movement failures. Focusing on prevention and recovery, at Workow level, redundancy can only be
done manually, but light-weight checkpointing and restarting of the workow manager on failure is fully supported.
At Task level, checkpointing at OS-level is supported by PGRADE. Retries and resubmissions are supported by task
managers (EGEE WMS), and task management service selection is supported by the enactor. Restarting of task
managers and resource reliability measurement are planned to be supported in the future version.
3.8 ProActive
ProActive [19] is a middleware for parallel, distributed and multi-threaded computing. The ProActive Skeleton Frame-
work [19] is available since 2 years. Fault tolerance is an important issue for the system developers. Many of the fault
tolerance issues are handled by the lower level middleware, in this case ProActive. The Calcium framework is mainly
addressed as a Skeleton Framework, but generally ts the denitions stated in the questionnaire. The corresponding
components of the architecture are the following: The ProActive Executor is the unit of logic that executes the program
on the computation resources. The ProActive Enactor schedules tasks according to the application's semantics. The
ProActive Core provides relations with other services. At the level of Hardware, the ProActive Core is responsible
for detecting and recovering machine and network failures. The developers plan to address prevention issues for these
faults in a future version of the system. At the Operating System level, the ProActive Executor detects missing les,
running out of memory or disk space and disk quota exceedance. The prevention and recovery of these failures are
investigated for future releases, as well as the detection and recovery of network congestion and CPU time limit vi-
olation. At the Middleware level service unavailability, authentication, le staging and job submission faults can be
recognized by the Proactive Core, but recovery or prevention will only be available in a future version. The rest of
the listed faults (job loss, pending and concurrent request overload) are planed to be supported later. At Task level the
ProActive Enactor detects uncaught exceptions and incorrect output data. The rest of the faults listed at this level are
not supported yet, but they are planned to be treated at all stages in a future version. At Workow level data movement,
input errors and unavailability are detected, but prevention and recovery issues are under development, as well as in-
nite loop elimination. Finally at the highest level user-dened exceptions are detected by the Executor, prevention or
recovery is planned for future releases together with user assertions. Regarding prevention and recovery, at Workow
level the transaction/rollback mechanisms are supported by ProActive Core, redundancy usage and workow man-
agement service restart are scheduled for next releases. At Task level, retries, resubmissions and checkpointing are
supported by the Enactor and the Core. Task migration and task manager service restart are under investigation.
3.9 Triana
The Triana problem solving environment [20] is an open source problem solving environment developed at Cardiff
University that combines an intuitive visual interface with powerful data analysis tools. Already used by scientists
for a range of tasks, such as signal, text and image processing, Triana includes a large library of pre-written analysis
tools and the ability for users to easily integrate their own tools. It exists since 5 years. They regard fault tolerance as
an important issue. Support for fault tolerance is generally user driven and interactive in Triana with little automated
systems. For example, faults will generally cause workow execution to halt, display a warning or dialog, and allow
the user to modify the workow before continuing execution. At the lowest level, machine cashes and network errors
are recognized by GridLab GAT [21] and the Triana Engine [20] respectively, but recovering from these faults or
preventing them is only planned for future versions. Looking at the Operating System level, missing les are detected
by the Engine and GAT, prevention or recovery is under investigation for future releases, as well as the other listed
faults at this level. At the Middleware and Task levels, all the listed faults can be detected by the Engine or GAT, except
for deadlock, livelock and memory leaks. All the listed faults at both levels will be treated in the future version with
prevention and recovery. At the next level, the Workow level, data movement and input availability errors are detected
by the Triana Engine. The listed faults together with User level faults are planned to be handled in future releases.
Focusing on prevention and recovery, at Workow level light-weight checkpointing and the restart or selection of
workow management services are currently supported, the rest of the features are planned to be supported later.
Regarding Task level, retries, resubmissions, alternate task creations, restarts or selection of task managers are already
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supported by the Engine, and the rest of the listed features in this category are under investigation for future releases.
3.10 Unicore 5
UNICORE (Uniform Interface to Computing Resources) [9] offers a ready-to-run Grid system including client and
server software. UNICORE makes distributed computing and data resources available in a seamless and secure way
in intranets and the internet. The workow management of Unicore 5 has a history of 5 years. At the lowest levels, the
Hardware and Operating System levels, all the listed faults can be detected by the NJS (Scheduler) [9]. At Middleware
level, the authentication is managed by Unicore Gateways, and all the listed faults are detected by NJS. The prevention
of having too many concurrent requests and the recovery from job loss and service unavailability are possible. Pre-
venting methods for service unavailability and le staging errors are investigated, as well as recovering from staging
faults. At Task level, memory leaks, uncaught exceptions, deadlocks and livelocks can be detected by TSI (Target
System Interface) [9]. Missing shared libraries and job crashes are detected by NJS, but the recovery from job crashes
will only be supported in a future version. At the highest levels, the Workow- and User levels, data movement, input
availability failures and user-dened exceptions are recognized by NJS. Regarding prevention, at Workow and Task
levels the Site Monitor (SIMON) [9] is responsible for task manager and resource reliability measurements, while
regarding recovery, the NJS is used to retry failed jobs on the same resource.
4 Summary and comparison
In this section we summarize the results of the questionnaire evaluation. Figure 1 shows the percentage of the faults
in each of the categories that are detected by a Grid workow system on average.
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Figure 1: Average fault detection
We can see that Hardware-level faults (Machine crashed/down, Network down) can generally be successfully de-
tected by current workow systems. When it comes to the other categories, the situation is quite different. On the
OS-level, only 37% of the faults (Disk quota exceeded, Out of memory, Out of disk space, File not found, Network
congestion, CPU time limit exceeded) are currently detected on average. Detection of the faults on middleware level
(Authentication failed, Job submission failed, Job hanging in the queue of the local resource manager, Job lost before
reaching the local resource manager, Too many concurrent requests, Service not reachable/not responding, File staging
failure) is more common, an average of 62.8% of these faults can be detected by current Grid workow systems, which
is almost the same within Workow-level faults (Innite loop, Input data not available, Input error, Data movement
failed) with 62.5%. The worst fault detection can be seen on the Task-level (Memory leak, Uncaught exception, Dead-
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lock/Livelock, Incorrect output data, Missing shared libraries, Job crashes) and User-level (User-denable exceptions,
User-denable assertions), where only 30% (task-level) and 25% (user-level) of the faults are detected on average.
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Figure 2: Percentage of systems that can detect the various task level faults
More insight into the reasons for such a bad value on the task-level faults can be seen in Figure 2. It shows for
every task-level fault, the percentage of the systems that are able to detect the fault. We can see that only one out of the
ten systems studied is able to detect a memory leak that happens inside of an executed task. Deadlocks/Livelocks are
also only detected by one of the studied systems. While uncaught exceptions (e.g. numerical exception) and incorrect
output data are detected by three systems, missing shared libraries are only detected by two of the systems. Detection
of a crashed job seems to be a problem that most of the systems are able to solve, seven out of ten systems implement
this functionality, with one more system where this feature is planned for a future version.
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Figure 3: Average fault prevention
Figure 3 shows the percentage of the faults of every category that is prevented by a Grid workow system on
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average. We can see that fault prevention is virtually non-existent in the current versions of the studied Grid workow
systems, which is what we expected. We believe that the reason for this is to be found in the fact that Grid workow
management systems are usually working on a layer on top of the Grid middleware like Globus or Unicore, where the
needed functionality to prevent such faults is not accessible to the systems.
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Figure 4: Average fault recovery
Figure 4 shows the percentage of the faults of every category that a Grid workow system can recover from, on
average. While the average Grid workow system can recover from 45% of the hardware-level faults and 26% of the
middleware-level faults, it can only recover from 11.6% of the OS-level faults, 12.5% of the Workow-level faults and
6.7% of the Task-level faults. Taking a closer look at the task-level faults reveals that only four out of ten systems can
recover from a job crash.
Generally, it can be said that current systems can recover from far fewer faults than they can detect, especially on
the middleware and workow-levels.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of systems that implement at least one of the fault tolerance techniques in each of the
categories Task Redundancy (workow-level redundancy and task-level redundancy techniques), Resubmission (task-
level resubmission to the same resource, task-level resubmission to another resource), Workow-level checkpointing
(workow-level light-weight and heavy-weight checkpoint/restart techniques), Task-level checkpointing (task-level
checkpoint/restart and OS-level checkpoint/restart techniques), Management Service Redundancy (Workow-level:
choose another workow management service, restart a workow management service; Task-level: choose another
task management service, restart a task management service) and User-dened exception handling.
As expected, the techniques that are the easiest to implement are used by most of the systems. Resubmission
techniques are used by 80% of the systems; redundancy techniques are used by 40% of the current systems and are
planned for implementation in another 30% of the systems in a future version, raising the support to 70% of the
systems. While 60% of the systems use workow-level checkpointing techniques, only 30% of the systems are using
task-level checkpointing. This shows that it is still hard to implement task-level checkpointing in a satisfying way.
While only 40% of the systems use management service redundancy techniques, this might be due to the fact that not
all of the systems use a design that enables them to use redundant instances of management services. Surprisingly,
only 20% of the systems enable users to dene their own exception handling behavior.
5 Conclusions
This paper clearly shows that there denitely is an effort to make current workow managers fault-tolerant. In the
previous summary section several diagrams revealed the generally supported features and the open issues. As a nal
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Figure 5: Percentage of systems that implement at least one fault tolerance technique of the specied category
current middleware limitations denitely means a border that the available systems cannot cross. New mechnaisms
should be developed to extend detection to lower levels, such as hardware and job execution faults. The prevention
and recovery features are even weaker. Many of the detected faults are not handled with recovery, only little support
is given to the users. Since grid development is moving towards creating self-aware solutions, these techniques need
to appear in workow enactors, too. We believe the current situation revealed in this paper helps researchers to focus
on unsupported requirements, in this way future planning and work can be carried out more efciently, paying more
attention to user needs and system endurance.
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CoreGrid Work Package 5 - Grid Information and Monitoring Services
Questionnaire about fault-tolerance support in Grid workflow systems
Institute of Computer Science, University of Innsbruck. Austria





In this document, a workflow is a set/graph of tasks connected using data- and/or control-flow
edges.
General Questions
Name of your Grid Workflow system: insert system name
Website with information about the system: insert URL   
Is there any support for fault-tolerance in the current version of your Grid workflow
system?
 Yes  No
If yes, since when does your system support fault-tolerance techniques (e.g. since 2
years)?
     
If not, have you planned to implement fault-tolerance techniques for a future version?
 Yes  No, because insert reason
On a scale from 1 (very important) to 6 (not important), how important is fault-
tolerance for the future of your system?
(very important) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (not important)
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Fault detection




















Machine crashed / down
Network down
     
Hardware
     
Disk quota exceeded
Out of memory
Out of disk space
File not found
Network congestion
CPU time limit exceeded
     
Operating
System
     
Authentication failed
Job submission failed
Job hanging in the queue of
the local resource manager




Service not reachable / not
responding
File staging failure
     
     
Middleware








     
Task
     
Infinite Loop
Input data not available
Input error
Data movement failed
     
Workflow





     
User
     
Comments and additional explanation (optional):
     
                                                
1 User-definable exception: The user defines a condition for an exception (e.g. if the output
data size is bigger than 5 MB, a fault happened)
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Which service of your system is capable of detecting the following faults? (e.g.
Enactor, Scheduler, Broker, ...) If you are using a third-party provided software for
detection, please name that instead of  a service of your system.
Fault type Fault description Name of service
Machine crashed / down      
Network down      
          
Hardware
          
Disk quota exceeded      
Out of memory      
Out of disk space      
File not found      
Network congestion      
CPU time limit exceeded      
          
Operating
System
          
Authentication failed      
Job submission failed      
Job hanging in the queue of the local resource manager      
Job lost before reaching the local resource manager      
Too many concurrent requests      
Service not reachable / not responding      
File staging failure      
          
          
Middleware
          
Memory leak      
Uncaught Exceptions (e.g. numerical)      
Deadlock / Livelock      
Incorrect output data      
Missing shared libraries      
Job crashed      
          
Task
          
Infinite Loop      
Input data not available      
Input error      
Data movement failed      
          
Workflow
          
User-definable exceptions (explain in a footnote)      
User-definable assertions      
          
User
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Comments and additional explanation (optional):
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Fault Prevention and Recovery
(After the fault happened)














Transaction / Rollback mechanism
Workflow replication
Data replication
Choose another workflow management service
Restart a workflow management service
Task management service reliability measurement
     
     
Workflow
     
Retry / Resubmission to the same resource
Resubmission to another Resource
Task Migration
Checkpoint/restart mechanism





Choose another task management service
Restart a task management service
Resource reliability measurement
     
Task
     
User-defined exception handling
     
     
User
     
Comments and additional explanation (optional, e.g. how does your system prevent
faults and which can it prevent, how do your fault-recovery techniques work, ...):
     
                                                
2 Light-Weight Checkpointing: saving only the current location of the intermediate data, not the data itself. Fast,
but restarting can only work as long as the intermediate data is available at its original location
3 Heavy-Weight Checkpointing: saving all of the intermediate data in a place where it can be kept for as long as
needed.
4 Task Replication: create multiple alternative Task implementations simultaneously
5 Alternate Task: using a different Task implementation if one fails
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Which service of your system provides the following fault-recovery techniques? (e.g.
Enactor, Scheduler, Broker, ...) If you are using a third-party provided software for
recovery, please name that instead of a service of your system.
Abstraction
Level
Description Name of service
Redundancy      
Light-weight checkpoint/restart mechanism      
Heavy-weight checkpoint/restart mechanism      
Transaction / Rollback mechanism      
Workflow replication      
Data replication      
Choose another workflow management service      
Restart a workflow management service      
Task management service reliability measurement      
          
          
Workflow
          
Retry / Resubmission to the same resource      
Resubmission to another Resource      
Task Migration      
Checkpoint/restart mechanism      
Checkpoint/restart on the OS level      
Task Replication      
Alternate Task      
Choose another task management service      
Restart a task management service      
Resource reliability measurement      
          
Task
          
User-defined exception handling      
          
          
User
          
Comments and additional explanation (optional):
     
Please provide additional comments, hints and references about fault-tolerance for
Grid workflow systems:
     
